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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5248
This paper estimates the effect of school-based 
management on student performance in the Philippines 
using the administrative dataset of all public schools in 
23 school districts over a 3-year period, 2003–2005. The 
authors test whether schools that received early school-
based management interventions (training in school-
based management and direct funding for school-based 
reforms) attained higher average test scores than those 
that did not receive such inputs. The analysis uses school-
level overall composite test scores (comprising all subject 
areas tested) and test scores in three separate subject areas: 
English, math, and science. Their preferred estimator, 
difference-in-difference with propensity score matching, 
shows that the average treatment effect of participation in 
school-based management was higher by 1.5 percentage 
points for overall composite scores, 1.2 percentage 
points for math scores, 1.4 percentage points for English 
scores, and 1.8 percentage points for science scores. 
These results suggest that the introduction of school-
This paper—a joint product of East Asia Education Sector Unit, Independent Evaluation Group; and the World Bank 
Institute—of a broader Bank-wide effort to promote rigorous and analytical approaches to monitoring and evaluation. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at nkhattri@worldbank.org.  
based management had a statistically significant, albeit 
small, overall positive effect on average school-level test 
scores in 23 school districts in the Philippines. The paper 
provides a first glimpse of the potential for school-based 
management in an East Asian context based on available 
administrative data. The authors suggest that the next 
order of research is to answer policy-related questions 
regarding the reforms: what aspects of the reform lead 
to desired results; are there differential effects across 
subpopulations; and what are the potential downsides to 
the reforms? The Philippines is embarking on a nation-
wide implementation of school-based management and 
the authors recommend that mechanisms for rigorous 
evaluations be advanced simultaneously. Such evaluations 
should not only provide more accurate estimates of the 
effectiveness of the reforms, but also help answer policy-
related questions regarding design and implementation of 
those reforms in different socio-cultural contexts.  
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1.  Introduction  
Decentralization is a key feature of institutional reform throughout the world.
2 The main argument 
underpinning decentralization policies is that they empower people to be part of the local decision-making 
process –they improve government performance by alleviating information asymmetries and costs by 
bringing decision-making closer to the people concerned. However, decentralization can also worsen the 
provision of public goods in the presence of externalities, lack of technical capabilities by local 
governments, or capture of lower-level administration by local elites.
3 In the context of the education 
sector, decentralization typically includes one or more of the following features: decentralized revenue 
generation, curriculum design, school administration, and teacher hiring and management. Decision-
making authority for these types of functions is devolved to regional/municipal governments or to schools 
themselves. The policy of allowing schools autonomy in decisions in these areas is referred to as school-
based management (SBM), school based governance, or school self management
4,
5. Responsibility and 
decision-making over different types of school operations are transferred to individuals at the school 
level, who in turn must conform within a set of centrally or state-level determined policies.  
 
The popularity of SBM is evidenced by the large number of development agencies promoting it as a key 
component of the decentralization reforms and the growing number of countries that have adopted aspects 
of this approach. SBM reforms began in the 1970s in Australia. Since then, a wide range of countries 
have experimented with or introduced SBM in all regions of the world, including Hong Kong (China), 
Indonesia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, Paraguay and Mexico.
 6   
 
Nevertheless, the impact of SBM on education quality, including student outcomes, remains a contentious 
issue, with some researchers arguing that SBM leads to enhanced educational outcomes,
7 while others 
contending that SBM leads to the deterioration of educational quality especially among the weakest 
schools.
8  The range of SBM approaches and the contexts in which they are implemented makes the 
debate about SBM quality an intricate one. The evaluation of SBM is complicated by the diversity of 
approaches to and elements of decentralization that collectively constitute “SBM” and by the institutional 
and socio-cultural contexts in which they are implemented.  Nonetheless, some studies in recent years 
have found that SBM reforms are associated with improved education outcomes and processes (e.g., 
                                                 
2 King and Ozler, 1998. 
3 Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2001 
4 De Grauwe, 2004 
5 Gertler, Patrinos, and Codina, 2006 
6 See “What is SBM?” World Bank (2007)  
7 e.g., Gertler, Patrinos, and Codina, 2006 
8 Bardhan, 2002.  
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Skoufias & Shapiro, 2006; Sawada & Ragatz, 2005; Gunnarsson et al., 2004; Eskeland & Filmer, 2002).  
However, rigorous evidence base for the effectiveness of SBM in boosting student performance is thin.   
A recent review of the empirical literature on SBM since 1995 indicates that only 14 studies utilized 
rigorous methods to assess the impact of SBM, and only six reported positive impacts on students’ test 
scores (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009) .  Eleven studies are country-specific from Latin America, one from 
Kenya, and two exploit data from multiple countries.  No empirical evidence is available from East Asia. 
 
This paper contributes to the small but growing empirical literature on the effectiveness of SBM by 
extending the research to East Asia.  The paper provides an initial analysis of the potential of school-
based management for improving educational outcomes in the Philippines, using aggregated school-level 
test scores and administrative data.  The data are quite limited and do not allow for a thorough analysis of 
the processes and approaches through which SBM reforms affect outcomes. Nonetheless, the paper 
attempts to use existing data to answer an initial question: did the introduction of SBM lead, on average, 
to enhanced educational outcomes?   It also demonstrates how administrative data can be mined for 
exploratory assessments of potentially larger programs.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a brief overview of the SBM 
program in the Philippines; section 3 outlines the methodological approaches used for the analysis; 
section 4 describes the data; section 5 discusses the empirical results; and section 6 provides a summary 
of our conclusions, discusses the limitations of the study, and highlights the implications for future, more 
rigorous SBM evaluations in the Philippines.   
 
2.  SBM Program in the Philippines 
 
SBM was implemented in between 2003 and 2005 in 23 districts participating in the Third Elementary 
Education Project (TEEP) supported by the World Bank.
9   The project provided funding for school 
infrastructure, training, curriculum development, and textbooks.  SBM was introduced as an integrating 
framework for obtaining school-level project inputs and building school capacity for education planning 
and program implementation beginning in school year 2003-04.  Schools participating in SBM were 
required to design a five-year School Improvement Plan (SIP) in partnership with parents and the 
community using data such as student achievement and students’ learning needs assessments, with the 
school principal or head teacher leading the process.  Based on the SIP, schools developed an Annual 
                                                 
9 Although some other school districts in the Philippines had ongoing SBM initiatives, they are not included in this 
analysis as insufficient information is available about the nature and timing of those initiatives.   
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Implementation Plan (AIP) at the beginning of the school year and a report card to be shared with the 
community at the end of the school year.  Project inputs for infrastructure, training, textbooks, and so 
forth, were partially based on the SIP.   Principals and head teachers received training in leading the 
development and implementation of the SIP and the AIPs in collaboration with teachers and key members 
of the larger community.   SBM schools also received funds for maintenance and operating expenses 
directly in cash rather than in kind, as had been the case previously. These cash funds could be used by 
the schools based on their AIP,   The cash allocation was based on a formula that provided each school 
with a flat amount of funds plus a prorated figure based on the number of student and teachers as well as 
other criteria, such as percentage of indigenous student population in the school.  Schools not 
participating in the SBM received no SBM-related training and no cash funds, and they were not required 
to develop SIPs and AIPs. 
 
The SBM was designed to improve student outcomes through two main venues:  by empowering the 
school community to identify education priorities and to allocate the school maintenance and operating 
budgets to those priorities (such as curriculum enrichment programs); and by enhancing transparency and 
accountability through the annual implementation plans and school report cards.  However, the SBM 
program articulated no explicit assumptions regarding the timeframe within which improvements in 
student achievement were expected to take place.  Systematic data on the level of uptake and 
implementation of the key features of the reforms are also not available.  
 
The SBM training, funds, and requirements were rolled out in three batches and eventually covered 
almost all (84 percent) of the 8,613 schools in the 23 project districts.  The first batch comprised 1,666 
schools in 2003-2004, largely because they were perceived to be more capable, although no explicit 
assignment mechanism was designed.
10  The next batch of 2,700 schools was targeted for SBM rollout in 
2004-2005, and another batch of 1,529 was included in 2005-2006. 
 
3.  Analytic Approach 
 
We assess the effects of SBM on student performance using average school-level test scores from all 
schools and school-level indicators between 2003 and 2005 from the 23 TEEP districts in the Philippines.  
We base our analysis on a pipeline comparison strategy.  Since we have student achievement data over a 
three year period, but schools were inducted into the program in three batches over time, we identify the 





treatment group as the first batch of schools that received SBM funds in 2003-2004. The treatment group 
consists of the schools that did not receive SBM funds and training in 2003-2004.  Therefore, for this 
study, we operationalized SBM batch one schools as the treatment group (n=1666) and all other schools 
(batches that received the SBM intervention later) as the control group (n=3501).
11  In our analysis, the 
treatment group (batch one) therefore had exposure to SBM for a period of two years, 2003-04 and 2004-
05. 
 
Because selection into SBM was not voluntary, there is likely to be placement bias in our control and 
treatment groups. We therefore use two non-experimental evaluation techniques to estimate program 
impact: difference-in-difference estimators and difference-in-difference with propensity score matching 
estimators. Using nonparametric kernel matching techniques, we correct for potential sources of bias.  
 
Specifically, we tested whether the composite test scores and test scores individually in three subject areas 
(math, science and English) were higher after SBM was introduced for schools in the treatment group 
compared to those in the control group.   
 
4.  Data and Statistical Specification 
 
We use school administrative data from all 5,167 schools in the 23 TEEP districts to examine the effect of 
SBM program on student test scores. The dataset includes information on school personnel, students, 
facilities, and enrollment and dropouts for all schools in the district over a 3-year period, 2002-2003 to 
2004-2005. The data were collected by the Philippines Department of Education as part of the 
management of the Third Elementary Education Project (TEEP) of which SBM was one component.  
 
Student achievement is measured using National Achievement Tests conducted in 2002-03 (year one – 
pre-intervention) in Grade 4, 2003-04 (year two) in Grade 5, and 2004-05 (year three, post-intervention) 
in Grade 6 in English, mathematics, science.  However, only the school-level Mean Percentile Score 
(MPS) data are available in the dataset, limiting the analysis to the school level.  We utilize the composite 
MPS computation (based on tests in all subjects), as well as the English, mathematics, and science MPS 
for 2002-03 (pre-intervention) and 2004-05 (post-intervention). 
 
                                                 
11 The number of schools in the analysis is not the same as the number of schools included in the SBM program due 
to missing information.  The difference is 728 schools.   
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Our method of analysis consists of two quasi-experimental evaluation techniques. We have data on test 
scores over three years for all schools. We also have time-invariant data on school characteristics. Once 
we determined the control and treatment groups as described in the preceding section, the preferred 
estimator to use in this context was the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. However, in order for 
the DID estimator to provide credible estimates of the program impact, it should be free of any biases 
inherited by pre-existing (pre-intervention) differences between treatment and control groups. Because of 
problems incurred with using the DID estimator due to way in which SBM program was rolled out (i.e., 
no clear assignment mechanism), we also estimate and discuss DID in conjunction with propensity score 
matching (PSM) to estimate average treatment effects.  
 
(i)  Difference-in-differences (DID) estimation 
The ideal experiment for identifying the effects of SBM on student test scores would have been to 
randomly assign schools to control and treatment groups. The SBM effect could then have been estimated 
by comparing schools that received SBM with their peers in the comparison group. Unfortunately, such a 
design is not feasible in this case because of the nature of the SBM program rollout. Therefore, we 
assigned the set of schools that received early intervention in 2003 as the treatment group. The control 
group comprised all other schools that did not receive SBM support in 2003 – i.e., schools that received 
the intervention later. The SBM effect on student test scores can be evaluated as follows: 
 
SBM effect =  ) ( ) ( . , , . PRE NONSBM POST NONSBM PRE SBM POST SBM TestScores Testscores Testscores TestScores     
        --------------------(eq.  1) 
Converting equation (1) above to an estimating model, we get: 
ts p ts s t s t t s Z SBM Year SBM Year Y               4 3 2 1 0 , ) * (  
        -------------------(eq.  2) 
where Y is the outcome measure. We include school-level composite test scores as well as test scores in 
math, science, and English as outcome measures. Year is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 for post-
intervention and equals 0 for pre-intervention. SBM is a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 indicating 
that a school received SBM support during all of the treatment years (t =2002-2004). Z is a vector of 
school characteristics. p  is division-specific fixed effects intended to capture division-specific aggregate 
fixed effects correlated with schooling outcomes (demographic trends or changes in government, for  
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example).  s t,  is the school level error term that includes all the unobserved school characteristics  that we 
assumed are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables for the time being.
12  
 
The vector of school characteristics includes total enrollment, total dropout, student-teacher ratio, 
textbooks per student, teacher manual per teacher, school type, school head type, whether the school was 
an elementary leader school (a school considered to be a leader among others in the district) and whether 
the school had received SIIF funds.
13  School type consists of four categories: complete combination and 
multi-grade schools; complete large and medium school; complete small schools; and primary schools. 
School head type consisted of three categories: head principal, head teacher, and teacher in charge. Table 
1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all schools and by treatment status of the school.  
 
0   is the intercept showing the average test scores of the SBM and non-SBM schools;  1  shows the 
change between 2002-03 and 2004-05;  2   is the difference in the treatment and control group; and  3  is 
the DID estimator capturing the differences between the control and treatment groups, before and after the 
intervention. More specifically, it measures the SBM effect as the change in average school-level test 
scores among two groups before and after the 2003 SBM intervention.  These groups included: the “first 
batch,” or the schools that received SBM first (treatment group) to schools that received the intervention 
later and those that did not receive the intervention at all (comparison group).  
 
In order to obtain the DID estimates, we created a panel dataset from our original dataset of 5,167 
schools. Since we had test scores for all three years, we simply replicated this data for every year to 
obtain a panel dataset with 15,501 observations. In this dataset, each school is observed in each of the 
three years (2002-03 to 2004-05). 
 
In order to use the DID estimates in this context, we need to be certain that the difference in post-
intervention outcomes between SBM and non-SBM schools would have been identical in the absence of 
the intervention. However, this assumption is impossible to test because we do not actually observe the 
counterfactual. We can nonetheless test whether pre-intervention and “mid-term” educational outcomes 
                                                 
12 The intervention might alter the number of children enrolling in a particular school. If as a consequence the 
distribution of students’ skills changes in treatment schools (with respect to control schools), then the program 
impact estimates are likely to be biased. We will explore the existence of this bias in section five when discuss the 
caveats. The characteristics of the average student in the school are also included in the error term because of lack of 
data on individual students’ characteristics. 




under study were similar between the treatment group and the proposed control group. If the pre-
intervention and “mid-term” (past baseline and probably without implemented intervention) outcome 
measures were not significantly different between treatment and control schools, there is no compelling 
reason to believe they would be significantly different in the post-intervention periods had the SBM 
program not been put in place. However, if we observe changes between pre-intervention and mid-term, 
we can consider the possibility that the two groups would have diverged with respect to their outcomes 
even in the absence of the SBM intervention.  We can test this assumption for the proposed treatment and 
control groups by running the following equation on the pre-SBM data (i.e. 2002-2003): 
    
  ts p st SBM Year Year Y               ) * ( ) ( 0 / 1 1 2003 / 0 2002 2 1 2003 / 0 2002 1 0  
          -------------------(eq.  3)
 
Y is the outcome measure including:  school level composite test scores and test scores individually in 
math, science, and English. Year is a dummy variable that takes value = 1, if year =2003-04 and =0 if 
year=2002-03 (both pre-intervention and implementation years). SBM is a dichotomous variable that is 
equal to 1 if the school s received SBM support (SBM=1). As in eq. (2),  p  is intended to capture 
division-specific aggregate fixed effects and  s t,  is the error term. We are interested in two issues: first, 
was there a pre-existing difference between SBM and non-SBM schools before the intervention; and two, 
did the difference increase over time (between 2002-03 and 2003-04). The coefficient for the interaction 
term can be interpreted as follows:  if the coefficient  2  =0, then the pre-SBM outcomes for schools that 
would eventually receive SBM funds are not significantly different from those in the control group (i.e., 
schools that did not receive SBM funds in 2003).  
 
We run equation (3) separately for years 2002-03 and 2003-04. When year=2002-03 (pre-intervention), 
we do not have a coefficient for 1 
. Table 2 reports the results from equation (3).  For 2002, we report 
coefficient  2 
which shows the difference between SBM and non-SBM schools at the baseline (2002-03). 
For 2003-04 (mid-term), we report  2 
 which shows the increase in test scores of SBM schools compared 
to non-SBM schools in 2003-04 compared to the baseline (2002-03). For both years Model A is a simple 
OLS and  
Model B includes division fixed effects. For overall test scores, Model B in Table 2 shows that  
2 
 =2.0, implying that overall test scores for schools that would eventually receive SBM funds in 2003 
were about 2 percentage points higher than non-SBM schools in 2002-03. In 2003-04 ( mid-term), the  
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difference in overall test scores between SBM and non-SBM schools was about 3.0, implying that overall 
test scores for SBM schools 3 percentage points higher than non-SBM schools in 2003 compared to 2002.   
 
Table 2 shows there are significant differences in the pre-intervention period in test scores (math, science, 
English and overall) across schools that would eventually receive SBM and those that did not receive 
SBM in 2003.  Based on these results, it appears that program placement bias is a serious concern in this 
context, and that difference-in-difference estimates may not give us unbiased estimates of the program 
effect. Therefore, in addition to difference-in-difference estimates, we also obtain propensity score 
matching estimates as a means of achieving unbiased identification of the SBM effect.  
 
(ii) Propensity score matching (PSM) estimation 
One of the potentially most serious problems in any evaluation study is the occurrence of placement bias. 
In this case, the problem arises because we would like to know students’ test scores with and without the 
SBM intervention. The results in Table 2 indicate that placement bias is a serious concern in this case 
because SBM and non-SBM schools are substantially different even in the absence of the treatment. The 
matching approach is one possible solution to the selection problem. This method originated from the 
statistical literature and shows a close link to the experimental context
14. The basic idea is to identify 
within a large group of non-participants those individuals who are similar to the participants in all 
relevant pre-treatment characteristics X. The assumption is that once this is done, differences in outcomes 
between the matched control group and the treatment participants can be attributed to the program.  
 
Since conditioning on all relevant covariates is limited in case of a high dimensional vector X (`curse of 
dimensionality'), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of so-called balancing scores b(X), i.e., 
functions of the relevant observed covariates X such that the conditional distribution of X given b(X) is 
independent of assignment into treatment. One possible balancing score is the propensity score, i.e., the 
probability of participating in a program given observed characteristics X. Matching procedures based on 
this balancing score are known as propensity score matching (PSM) and we will use PSM matching in 
conjunction with DID as the preferred estimator in this paper. PSM proposes that all pre-treatment 
characteristics of a unit of observation is summarized into a single index (the propensity scores) and the 
units of observations are then matched on their propensity scores.   
 
According to Skoufias and Shapiro (2006), the propensity score is defined as the conditional probability 
of receiving a treatment (receiving SBM) given pre-treatment characteristics X, i.e. 
                                                 




p(X) ≡ Pr (D = 1| X ) = E(D | X )   
------------------------------(eq. 4) 
where D is the indicator for receiving treatment (=1 if SBM, =0 if non-SBM). As shown by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983), if the propensity score p(X) is known, then the PSM estimator for ATT (`average 
treatment effect on the treated’) can be estimated as follows:  
)]} ( , 0 / [ )] ( , 1 / [ { 0 ) 1 / ( X p D Y E X p D Y E E T i D X P
PSM
ATT       
 ------------------------------(eq.5) 
The potential outcomes are defined as Yi(Di) for each individual i, where i = 1….N and N denotes the total 
population. To put eq. 5 in words, the PSM estimator is simply the mean difference in outcomes over the 
common support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants. 
 
When estimating the propensity scores, two choices must be made. The first one concerns the model to be 
used for the estimation, and the second one requires identifying the variables to be included in the model. 
We use a logit model to estimate propensity scores. The variables in the model were selected to satisfy the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA). The matching strategy builds on the CIA, requiring that the 
outcome variable(s) must be independent of treatment, conditional on the propensity score. Hence, 
implementing matching requires choosing a set of variables X that credibly satisfy this condition. Only 
variables that influence simultaneously the participation decision and the outcome variable should be 
included. We included five explanatory variables in the logit model: student-teacher ratio; size of school 
(total enrollment in 2002 base year); school type (incomplete vs. complete schools & 
combination/multigrade schools vs. mono schools); type of school head (principal vs. teachers and 
teacher-in-charge).  
 
The results from the logit model are presented in Table 3. We impose the common support area condition 
to ensure that any combination of characteristics observed in the treatment schools can also be observed 
among the control group.
15 We then apply the nonparametric kernel matching technique to match schools 
based on their propensity scores within school divisions. We matched schools at the division level 
because the SBM intervention took place within school divisions. Kernel matching uses weighted 
averages of all individual cases in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. Thus, one 
major advantage of these approaches is the lower variance which is achieved because more information is 
used.  






Since we do not condition on all covariates but on the propensity score, it has to be checked if the 
matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the control and 
treatment group. Several procedures have been suggested to check the matching quality. The basic idea 
behind these approaches is to compare the situation before and after matching, and verify whether any 
differences remain after conditioning on the propensity score. If differences exist, matching on the score 
was not (completely) successful and remedial measures must be taken. We use a stratification test 
proposed by Dehejia and Wahba (2002) that divides observations into strata based on the estimated 
propensity score, such that no statistically significant difference remains between the estimated propensity 
score means of the treatment and control groups. We then use t-tests within each stratum to test if the 
distribution of X-variables is the same between both groups. Table 4 presents the absolute t-scores for the 
X-variables across SBM and non-SBM school by quintiles. We notice that across variables there are no 
significant differences between SBM and non-SBM schools on most variables except total enrollment.
16,17   
 
Finally, given the availability of data over three years we use the differences-in-difference estimator 
(developed by Heckman et al. in 1997, 1998a,b) to calculate the average treatment effect (ATE). This 
estimator compares the before-after test scores of SBM schools with the corresponding before and after 
changes among non-SBM schools, conditional on covariates X. This builds on the simple differences-in-
difference statistic by controlling for covariates X and estimating the differences using nonparametric 
methods. The advantages of this estimator are similar to the advantages of the DID regression – it 
eliminates any unobserved factors that vary between observations, although not over time. This matching 
estimator allows selection on unobservables as long as the unobservable factors do not change between 
observations over time. Given the aforementioned advantages of the simple regression-based DID 
estimator, the DID with matching is our preferred estimator of program impact.   
 
5.   Results 
 
Table 5 presents the simple means of school level test scores across SBM and non-SBM schools, before 
and after the intervention in 2003, without controlling for other explanatory variables. These figures do 
not control for any selection bias. Given that there is a strong possibility of selection bias, these estimates 
are helpful in showing trends and observing overall differences. However, we cannot make any claims of 
                                                 
16 Some of the cells do not show t-scores because there were no observations for that particular variable in that cell. 
17 We tried several combinations of variables, but due to a limited dataset and number of available variables, kernel 
matching using the variables noted above provided the closest matches.  
 
12
causality based on these comparisons. We examined test scores along four categories: math, English, 
science and overall (composite of all test scores).  
 
Comparing SBM schools over time, we find that SBM schools scored higher in 2004 (year 3) in all areas 
including:  math by 16.57 percentage points, science by 11.74 percentage points, English scores by 18.57 
percentage points and in overall scores by 16.16 percentage points. We find similar increases in test 
scores for non-SBM schools, although the increases are not as large as they are for SBM schools. Math 
scores increased by 15.46 percentage points, science scores increased by 10.37 percentage points, English 
scores increased by 16.66 percentage points and overall scores increased by 14.65 percentage points.   
 
Cross-sectionally, we find that SBM and non-SBM schools performed relatively similarly in 2002 (pre-
intervention) (see Table 5). In 2005, the SBM schools performed better than did non-SBM schools. For 
example, math scores between SBM and non-SBM schools increased to 1.58 percentage points, science 
scores were 2.03 percentage points higher, English scores were 2.20 percentage points higher and overall 
scores are 1.98 percentage points higher for SBM schools compared to non-SBM schools.  
 
A simple difference-in-difference comparison (without controlling for any factors) between SBM and 
non-SBM schools shows that test scores increased more rapidly among SBM schools.  For instance, math 
scores increased by 1.12 percentage points for SBM schools, science scores increased by 1.36 percentage 
points, English scores by 1.91 percentage points and overall scores by 1.51 percentage points. Although 
these results point toward larger increase in test scores, we cannot make any causal inferences based on 
these estimates. 
 
Table 6 presents the estimates of the average treatment effect derived from three multivariate analysis 
techniques. Since we are primarily interested in testing whether the introduction of SBM had an effect on 
test scores, we present only the coefficients associated with the variable measuring program impact. The 
detailed regression results are presented in the appendices.  
 
The first column presents the estimates of the average treatment effects obtained from running an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model of equation (2) without any division level fixed effects. We find that 
there was a significant increase in overall test score (1.15 percentage points), as well as an increase in test 
scores in specific subject areas: science (1.37 percentage points) and English (1.14 percentage points); the 




Next, we ran equation (2) including division level fixed effects and find more or less similar results.  We 
find that there was a statistically significant increase in overall combined test scores (1.06 percentage 
points) as well as an increase in science (1.28 percentage points) and English scores (1.05 percentage 
points). As with the OLS model, the increase in math scores for SBM schools compared to non-SBM 
schools was not significant.  
 
Finally, we present the results from DID estimators based on kernel matching. Generally, we find that the 
size of the impact was higher relative to DID without matching. Using kernel propensity score matching, 
we find that participating in the SBM program led to an increase of 1.45 percentage points in overall test 
score, 1.82 percentage points in science scores, and 1.32 percentage points in English scores. At 1.88 
percentage points, the relative increase in math scores is also significant at the 10 percent level.    
 
Summing up the findings, we can conclude that SBM in the Philippines had a statistically significant 
impact on overall student test scores and test scores in English and science. The effect sizes were small to 
moderate: .10 for overall scores, .13 for science, .09 for English, and .07 for math.
18   These are not 
inconsistent with Borman’s (2002) analysis, which shows effect sizes of .17 to .14 after one and two years 
of implementation, respectively, and increasing with years of continued implementation.  If we use the 
coefficients based on OLS and Fixed-Effects models, the effect sizes would be estimated to be lower.  
 
6.  Conclusions, Limitations, and Implications for the Philippines  
 
This study of the SBM program in the Philippines shows that school-averaged student performance on 
national tests improved between 2002-03 and 2004-05 and that the level of improvement was higher for 
schools involved in SBM for two years compared with schools that had not yet received the intervention 
or received the intervention later.  School-averaged student performance improved in math, science, and 
English and on the composite score.  Improvement for schools that received SBM early was significantly 
higher in science and English and on composite test scores. 
 
The Philippines has embarked on a nation-wide effort to introduce and implement SBM.  While this paper 
provides an early indication of the usefulness of SBM in a few districts in the country and its promise for 
other parts of the country, it also highlights an opportunity for introducing a SBM program rollout design 
that would permit a more rigorous analysis of the contribution of SBM to student outcomes in the 
                                                 
18 See Cohen (1988) for a discussion on the magnitude of effect size.  Effect size is calculated by dividing the 
coefficient for interaction term, SBMxPostintervention, by the standard deviation of the 2002-03 baseline score.  
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Philippines.  We discuss the limitations of the study and provide some recommendations for a program of 
SBM evaluation in the Philippines. 
 
First although the study found significant differences between SBM and non-SBM schools on school-
level outcomes, the possibility of unmeasured differences influencing outcomes exists.  The findings in 
impact evaluations are critically dependent on the choice of the comparison group.  In the context of this 
study, although a comparison group was identified, whether the group represented a good counterfactual 
is more difficult to argue.  SBM funds were disbursed in batches and since we had data for all schools, we 
chose the first batch of SBM schools as the treatment school and created a counterfactual using available 
administrative data.    
 
Although our model controls for a number of important school-level factors such as student-teacher ratio, 
school size, school type, and school head type, it is quite possible that other unobservable variables 
affected the outcomes.  For example, the model does not capture student-level data (e.g., socio-economic 
background), which literature shows to have a significant relationship to student achievement.  School 
personnel quality may similarly play a role. Furthermore, although we rely on the assumption that 
propensity-score matching would have accounted for some unmeasured differences, important differences 
cannot be ruled out.  
 
While quasi-experimental evaluation methods are an improvement over simple multivariate techniques, 
they are not a substitute for more rigorous experimental designs. Taking an experimental approach where 
the treatment group is randomly selected would allow for a direct test of the effects of the intervention.  
For instance, if those who received SBM in the first batch were randomly selected with control schools 
that meet the same criteria, a simple differences-in-difference method would have sufficed.  It is 
understandable that in real world conditions, however, an experimental design can be challenging to 
implement. While it is difficult to identify control groups that will never receive the program benefits, it is 
possible to implement a pipeline approach and roll out the program in batches, using randomization or a 
clear assignment mechanism over time, to enable “control groups” to be built in.  This would provide 
program leaders with an opportunity by which to assess the effectiveness of the intervention among 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who are similar in every other respect. Such a method would be 
superior to the one we have presented here, where we rely on statistical methods to create a control group 




Second, the time frame captured in this study is very small, only two years of SBM preparation and 
implementation. In order to fully assess the impact of SBM, the assumptions regarding how the reforms 
play out over time and eventually affect student achievement will need to be articulated and examined 
explicitly.  The possibility of a “hawthorne” effect cannot be eliminated, and, potentially, an evaluation 
with a longer time-frame would permit the identification of longer-term effects.  Behrman and King 
(2008) highlight the risks of a poorly timed evaluation, ranging from finding partial or no impacts, when 
they in fact would take a longer time to materialize, to the risk of scaling up a poor program, by waiting 
too long to evaluate.  Articulating clear assumptions regarding the reforms would assist with 
implementing evaluations in a timely fashion. 
 
Third, the study does not examine the processes through which SBM affected school performance.  
Barrera-Osorio et al.’s (2009) review of the SBM literature conceptualizes the range of SBM approaches 
along two dimensions: who has the power to make decisions and the degree of decision-making devolved 
to the school level.  The review notes that “With so many possible combinations of these two dimensions, 
almost every SBM reform is unique.” (pg. 4).  While some programs transfer authority to principals or 
teachers only, others encourage or mandate parental and community participation, often through school 
committees.  Furthermore, the contexts in which the authority is devolved are likely to play a role in the 
eventual effects.  For example, engaging parents and the wider community in school matters may not be 
easy in certain contexts – studies indicate that in communities with social and political tensions, the 
school board may be used as an instrument by the elite to orchestrate greater inequities.
19  Evidence from 
New Zealand and Australia demonstrates the under-representation of minority groups in the composition 
of school boards
20.   
 
Several previous papers have examined some components of, and the processes through which, SBM 
affects student achievement.  For example, Jimenez and Sawada (1998) examined 1996 data on 
Community Managed Schools (EDUCO), a program created to expand coverage in rural El Salvador, 
where communities received significant authority over schools, including in financial and staffing areas. 
They found that enhanced community and parental involvement in EDUCO schools improved students' 
language skills and diminished student absences, which may have long-term effects on achievement.   
Sawada and Ragatz (2005) also evaluated the EDUCO program and found that EDUCO transferred few 
administrative processes to local levels but gave local actors greater perceived influence in hiring and 
firing teachers.  Gunnarsson et al.’s (2004) model of education decentralization suggests that principals, 





teachers, and parents are more informed than are national decision-makers in the areas that should be a 
priority for improving learning quality. Thus, by empowering local authorities to make spending 
decisions, resources will be allocated more strategically for better quality.  Eskeland and Filmer (2002) 
similarly find that the autonomy of teachers, principals, and parents to make organizational and 
pedagogical decisions and the participation of parents in schools significantly increased primary school 
test scores in Argentina.  Available reports on TEEP indicate that several aspects of SBM may have been 
conducive to improved student performance:  improved school management through intensive principal 
and head-teacher training, identification of school-level needs and allocation of resources to those specific 
needs, greater community attention to schools’ and students’concerns.   
 
Fourth, the study does not examine the distribution of effects across different types of schools, both in 
terms of specified outcomes – student achievement – as well as unintended effects, such as toll on the 
principal’s and teachers’ time in community engagement.  For example, Berlinski and Galiani (2007) find 
that Argentina’s decentralization of secondary schools significantly increased test scores overall but 
decreased scores for schools in poor areas and in provinces with pre-decentralization fiscal deficits.  On 
the other hand, King and Ozler’s (1998) study of School Autonomy, a Nicaraguan SBM program,  found 
that autonomous schools, most of which were catering to deprived areas, yielded results comparable to 
those of other schools.  Unintended effects, or processes that eventually undermine desired effects, may 
exist as well.  The Implementation Completion Report for the TEEP project indicates that, indeed, 
community engagement demanded that principals and teachers spend considerable time on community 
relations in addition to their administrative and pedagogical responsibilities, a commitment that several 
were beginning to find burdensome. 
 
Thus, answers to questions regarding the conditions under which the different SBM models work and 
which implementation processes are effective are critically important from a policy and program design 
and implementation perspective. A new evaluation would present an opportunity to study such issues 
through focusing on such issues as well.   
 
Despite these limitations, this study intends to contribute to the growing body of studies that examine 
school based management as a tool for improving student outcomes. This study provides an initial case 
study on the Philippines, an area where SBM has not yet been evaluated.  Thus, this analysis suggests 




We end this paper with some words of advice for future evaluations of the ongoing SBM program in the 
Philippines. Barrera-Osorio et al.’s (2009) review of SBM studies concludes that retrospective evaluations 
of such program are extremely difficult to implement and recommends using prospective methods.  The 
SBM program in the Philippines is an ongoing exercise, and the analysis in our paper suggests that it was 
successful with respect to its objectives of improving student achievement, although the effects were 
small.  However, as the Department of Education in the Philippines moves forward with SBM and goes to 
scale across the country, it is important to collect data simultaneously in a systematic manner to enable 
scientific evaluations. The current data has several limitations which make it difficult to espouse 
conclusive statements about the success of the program and how it might generalize beyond the 23 
districts to the country as a whole. A new evaluation approach could enable the Department of Education 
to study both the implementation processes (what really makes SBM work) and assess impact in a more 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, by All Schools, SBM, and Non-SBM 
Variable  N Mean     SD N Mean     SD N Mean     SD
Dependent Variables, Year= 2002
Math 5167 46.14 17.32 1666 46.45 17.25 3501 46 17.35
English 5167 43.09 15.11 1666 43.29 14.79 3501 43 15.25
Science 5167 44.69 13.53 1666 45.14 13.17 3501 44.48 13.7
Total 5167 44.65 14.06 1666 44.97 14.01 3501 44.5 14.09
Dependent Variables, Year= 2003
Math 5167 53.98 17.15 1666 54.95 16.99 3501 53.51 17.2
English 5167 50.01 15.11 1666 51.02 14.9 3501 49.54 15.19
Science 5167 49.86 13.35 1666 50.81 13.25 3501 49.41 13.38
Total 5167 51.28 14.26 1666 52.26 14.18 3501 50.82 14.28
Dependent Variables, Year= 2004
Math 5167 61.97 17.1 1666 63.06 16.54 3501 61.46 17.34
English 5167 55.51 14.02 1666 56.9 13.56 3501 54.85 14.18
Science 5167 60.38 14.88 1666 61.88 14.49 3501 59.66 15.01
Total 5167 59.79 13.83 1666 61.15 13.38 3501 59.14 14
Other School Characteristics
Total enrollment 5167 266.06 219.64 1666 348.9 6.96 3501 226.86 2.86
Total Dropouts 5167 8.97 13.26 1666 11.78 16.19 3501 7.63 11.38
Student teacher ratio 5167 32.45 14.63 1666 31.64 11.35 3501 32.83 15.94
Textbooks per student 5167 3.58 2.58 1666 3.29 1.81 3501 3.71 2.86
Manuals per teacher 5167 4.05 2.98 1666 3.81 2.49 3501 4.17 3.18
Head teacher 5167 0.25 0.43 1666 0.29 0.45 3501 0.22 0.42
Head principal 5167 0.21 0.41 1666 0.33 0.47 3501 0.15 0.35
Complete combination and multigrade sch 5167 0.28 0.45 1666 0.16 0.37 3501 0.34 0.47
Complete Large and Medium Schools 5167 0.24 0.43 1666 0.39 0.49 3501 0.17 0.38
Complete Small Schools 5167 0.44 0.2 1666 0.44 0.13 3501 0.45 0.23
Primary Schools 5167 0.03 0.17 1666 0.01 0.09 3501 0.04 0.19
Elementary Leader Schools 5167 0.07 0.25 1666 0.15 0.36 3501 0.03 0.16
School received SIIF funds 5167 0.34 0.47 1666 0.48 0.5 3501 0.27 0.44

















Table 2: Differences in Scores between SBM and Non-SBM Schools during Pre-
Intervention (2002-2003) and Implementation (2003-2004) Periods 
 
1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B 4A 4B
Diff in 2002  0.463 2.112 0.289 1.845 0.669 2.148 0.469 2.022
[0.90] [4.35]*** [0.64] [4.35]*** [1.67]* [5.63]*** [1.11] [5.13]***
Diff in 2003 1.432 3.081 1.469 3.025 1.387 2.865 1.429 2.982
[2.79]*** [6.35]*** [3.27]*** [7.13]*** [3.47]*** [7.51]*** [3.39]*** [7.57]***
Division FE Incd Incd Incd Incd
N 10334 10334 10334 10334 10334 10334 10334 10334
Math Score Science Score English Score Total Score
 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  
Note: A denotes OLS; B denotes Fixed Effects 




Table 3: Estimation of Propensity Scores 
Number of observations  =  5167 
LR  Chi2(5)    =  439.44 
Prob>chi2    =    0 
Pseudo  R2    =  0.0676 
Log  likelihood    =  -3028.71 
 
Dependent variable: SBM 
Variables Coefficient  Std.  Error  z 
Student-teacher ratio  -0.011  0.002  -4.68 
School size  0.001  0.000  9.60 
Complete schools  0.471  0.253  1.86 
Monograde schools  0.544  0.083  6.55 
School head principals  0.370  0.086  4.29 
Intercept -1.848  0.271  -6.82 
The common support option was selected. The region of common support is .119, .943 
The final number of blocks is 10. This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score is 








Table 4: P-Score Quintiles, by SBM and Non-SBM Schools 
Non-SBM SBM t-score Non-SBM SBM t-score Non-SBM SBM t-score Non-SBM SBM t-score Non-SBM SBM t-score
Propensity Score 0.174 0.174 0.24 0.23 0.24 3.27*** 0.31 0.31 1.42 0.35 0.35 1.42 0.52 0.54 3.24***
Head_Principal 0.002 0.001 0.65 0.021 0.048 2.26** 0.01 0.003 1.27 0.14 0.11 1.42 0.88 0.84 1.57
Complete Schools 0.92 0.93 0.56 0.006 0.013 0.66 1 1 1 1
Monograde Schools 0.08 0.06 1.19 0.49 0.55 1.49 0.99 1 0.78
Student teacher ratio 36.78 37.24 0.36 32.21 33.04 0.59 28.95 30.46 2.34 31.5 31.4 0.16 31.6 30.2 2.28**
Total Enrollment 2002 114.5 121.3 1.64* 151.38 165.2 2.32** 193.4 202.6 2.34** 280.4 290.7 1.92** 514.7 574.5 3.14***
Quintile5 (n=1029) Quintile1 (n=1030) Quintile2 (n=1030) Quintile3(n=1029) Quintile4 (n=1030)
 




Table 5: Unconditional Test Score Means, By SBM/Non-SBM and Year 
   2002  2004  Diff  t‐stat 
          
Math Scores  46.14  61.96  15.82  46.71*** 
SBM  46.45  63.03  16.57  28.28*** 
non‐SBM  45.99  61.45  15.46  37.29*** 
Diff  0.46  1.58  1.12    
t‐stat  0.89  3.11***     
           
Science 
Scores  44.68  60.36  15.68  56.01*** 
SBM  45.14  56.87  11.74  34.82*** 
non‐SBM  44.47  54.84  10.37  44.21*** 
Diff  0.67  2.03  1.36    
t‐stat  1.66*  4.99***     
           
English 
Scores  43.09  55.50  12.41  43.29*** 
SBM  43.28  61.86  18.57  27.63*** 
non‐SBM  42.99  59.65  16.66  33.66*** 
Diff  0.29  2.20  1.91    
t‐stat  0.65  4.88***     
           
Overall 
Scores  44.64  59.78  15.13  55.14*** 
SBM  44.96  61.12  16.16  34.02*** 
non‐SBM  44.49  59.14  14.65  43.63*** 
Diff  0.47  1.98  1.51    
t‐stat  1.12  4.82***     





Table 6: Treatment Effects Based on OLS, DID (with fixed effects), and DID with Kernel-PSM 
 
      OLS  Fixed Effects  Kernel‐PSM 
   Scores           
1   Math Scores  0.851 0.743 1.88* 
2   English Scores  1.141** 1.046** 1.361** 
3   Science Scores  1.368*** 1.283*** 1.818*** 
4   Overall Scores  1.151** 1.058** 1.45** 
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%  
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Appendix A: OLS Regression Estimates of SBM Effects on School-Averaged Test Scores 
Dependent Variable Math English Science Overall
Post‐intervention (2004 – year 3) 12.357 9.188 13.14 12.076
[33.25]*** [28.85]*** [44.30]*** [40.02]***
SBM Batch1 School ‐0.381 ‐0.568 ‐0.75 ‐0.541
[0.98] [1.70]* [2.41]** [1.71]*
SBM School x Post‐intervention 0.851 1.141 1.368 1.151
[1.32] [2.07]** [2.66]*** [2.20]**
Does the school have any dropouts? 3.443 2.901 2.222 2.883
[9.37]*** [9.21]*** [7.58]*** [9.66]***
No of dropouts, given that the school had >0 
dropouts
‐0.336 ‐0.273 ‐0.264 ‐0.294
[11.94]*** [11.01]*** [11.44]*** [12.53]***
Size of School (total enrollment)  0000
 [.01] [0.55] [0.04] [0.23]
Student Teacher Ratio 0.027 ‐0.003 ‐0.004 0.007
[2.73]*** [0.28] [0.49] [0.83]
Textbook per student 0.742 0.589 0.641 0.656
[8.99]*** [8.30]*** [9.69]*** [9.76]***
Teacher Manual per teacher ‐0.522 ‐0.367 ‐0.417 ‐0.44
[7.28]*** [5.95]*** [7.26]*** [7.53]***
Head Teacher 2.872 2.713 2.885 2.77
[7.43]*** [8.18]*** [9.35]*** [8.82]***
Principal 1.299 2.057 2.186 1.896
[2.59]*** [4.72]*** [5.39]*** [4.59]***
Complete Combination and Multigrade School
3.737 2.207 2.187 2.677
[4.38]*** [3.02]*** [3.21]*** [3.87]***
Complete Mono Large and Medium School
7.312 5.652 6.384 6.303
[7.77]*** [6.40]*** [7.77]*** [7.54]***
Complete Mono Small School 5.304 3.365 3.908 4.097
[6.18]*** [4.53]*** [5.64]*** [5.82]***
Elementary Leader School 1.679 1.289 2.152 1.597
[2.70]*** [2.41]** [4.33]*** [3.16]***
Received SIIF Grant 0.756 0.903 1.187 0.955
[2.34]** [3.26]*** [4.59]*** [3.63]***
Constant 41.259 40.164 41.032 40.906
[44.63]*** [50.62]*** [55.53]*** [54.42]***
Observations 14823 14823 14823 14823




Appendix B: Difference-in-Difference with Division Level Fixed Estimates of SBM Effects on 
School-Averaged Test Scores 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Math English Science Overall
Post‐intervention (2004 – year 3) 12.484 9.328 13.23 12.186
[36.30]*** [31.69]*** [48.16]*** [44.30]***
SBM Batch1 School 1.071 0.63 0.49 0.706
[2.85]*** [1.96]** [1.63] [2.35]**
SBM School x Post‐intervention 0.743 1.046 1.283 1.058
[1.25] [2.05]** [2.70]*** [2.22]**
Size of School (total enrollment) 00 0 0
[0.99] [0.54] [0.18] [0.11]
Does the school have any dropouts? 3.78 3.322 2.442 3.171
[10.88]*** [11.17]*** [8.80]*** [11.41]***
No of dropouts, given that the school had >0 
dropouts
‐0.208 ‐0.164 ‐0.162 ‐0.183
[7.64]*** [7.04]*** [7.45]*** [8.41]***
Student Teacher Ratio 0.017 ‐0.002 ‐0.004 0.003
[1.70]* [0.29] [0.46] [0.38]
Textbook per student 0.229 0.159 0.229 0.198
[2.72]*** [2.20]** [3.40]*** [2.94]***
Teacher Manual per teacher ‐0.222 ‐0.139 ‐0.206 ‐0.184
[3.18]*** [2.33]** [3.70]*** [3.30]***
Head Teacher 2.213 2.171 2.261 2.177
[6.13]*** [7.02]*** [7.83]*** [7.53]***
Principal 1.832 2.281 2.304 2.193
[3.81]*** [5.54]*** [6.00]*** [5.70]***
Complete Combination and Multigrade School
3.341 2.098 2.184 2.486
[4.22]*** [3.09]*** [3.45]*** [3.92]***
Complete Mono Large and Medium School 6.937 5.254 6.001 5.902
[7.23]*** [6.39]*** [7.83]*** [7.69]***
Complete Mono Small  School 5.89 3.975 4.541 4.685
[7.30]*** [5.76]*** [7.05]*** [7.26]***
Elementary Leader School 2.582 1.983 2.79 2.378
[4.46]*** [4.00]*** [6.03]*** [5.13]***
Received SIIF Grant 0.145 0.287 0.534 0.311
[0.47] [1.09] [2.17]** [1.26]
Constant 41.426 39.704 40.672 40.764
[47.15]*** [52.79]*** [57.95]*** [58.01]***
Observations 14823 14823 14823 14823
Division fixed effects Incld Incld Incld Incld
R‐squared 0.14 0.12 0.23 0.2   
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Appendix C: DID with (Kernel) PSM of SBM Effects on School-Averaged Test  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Math English Science Overall
Post‐intervention (2004‐ year 3) 11.152 8.675 12.182 11.251
[26.46]*** [24.12]*** [36.27]*** [33.01]***
SBM Batch1 School ‐0.668 ‐0.77 ‐0.83 ‐0.737
[1.54] [2.07]** [2.39]** [2.10]**
SBM School x Post‐intervention 1.188 1.361 1.818 1.45
[1.66]* [2.22]** [3.18]*** [2.50]**
Size of School (total enrollment) 0000
[0.14] [0.55] [0.16] [0.20]
Does the school have any dropouts? 3.338 2.897 2.345 2.917
[8.03]*** [8.17]*** [7.08]*** [8.68]***
No of dropouts, given that the school had 
>0 dropouts ‐0.313 ‐0.254 ‐0.239 ‐0.271
[10.32]*** [9.80]*** [9.87]*** [11.03]***
Student Teacher Ratio 0.012 ‐0.017 ‐0.02 ‐0.007
[0.93] [1.62] [1.96]** [0.69]
Textbook per student 0.947 0.712 0.77 0.808
[9.14]*** [8.05]*** [9.32]*** [9.64]***
Teacher Manual per teacher ‐0.557 ‐0.349 ‐0.392 ‐0.446
[6.65]*** [4.88]*** [5.87]*** [6.58]***
Head Teacher 2.626 2.233 2.64 2.473
[5.93]*** [5.91]*** [7.48]*** [6.91]***
Principal 0.762 1.628 1.975 1.515
[1.32] [3.31]*** [4.30]*** [3.25]***
Complete Combination and Multigrade 
School 3.744 2.437 2.3 2.871
[3.90]*** [2.97]*** [3.01]*** [3.70]***
Complete Mono Large and Medium School 7.07 5.712 6.055 6.189
[6.11]*** [5.78]*** [6.56]*** [6.61]***
Complete Mono Small School 5.104 3.517 3.716 4.062
[5.22]*** [4.21]*** [4.77]*** [5.14]***
Elementary Leader School 1.47 0.794 1.814 1.245
[2.12]** [1.34] [3.28]*** [2.22]**
Received SIIF Grant 1.678 1.777 1.998 1.84
[4.69]*** [5.83]*** [7.02]*** [6.36]***
Constant 41.001 39.425 40.452 40.294
[38.29]*** [43.15]*** [47.42]*** [46.54]***
Observations 11349 11349 11349 11349
R‐squared 0.12 0.11 0.2 0.17
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 